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WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
We cannot emphasize too strongly that should this exception be ap-
plied as a barrier against public access to public affairs, it will not be
tolerated, for this court has consistently emphasized that respect for
and adherence to the First Amendment is absolutely essential to the
continuation of our democratic form of government.
As the court stated in Channel 10, because "[o]pen meeting laws and
their exceptions are a developing field of law," 8 the full application of
the exception for attorney-client meetings will be left to future cases for
development.
Landlord-Tenant Law-THE DUTIES OF A COMMERCIAL LANDLORD TO
INFORM AND PROTECT-Vermes v. American District Telegraph Co.,
Minn. -, 251 N.W.2d 101 (1977).
Vermes v. American District Telegraph Co. I has important ramifica-
tions for Minnesota landlord-tenant law. The case presented questions
about a landlord's duties to protect a tenant from crime and to inform
a prospective commercial tenant of potentially objectionable features of
the premises. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that a landlord has
both these duties.
In 1968, the plaintiff leased space for his jewelry store on the first floor
of a building owned by Apache Corporation. Apache did not disclose to
the plaintiff that an equipment access room was located directly above
the plaintiff's store and that the thin floor of this room formed the
ceiling of the store. This construction design allowed easy entry from
above into the store's vault. In 1971, the store was burglarized. The
illegal entry was made through the insecure ceiling of the vault.
To recover losses sustained from the burglary, the plaintiff brought
suit against Apache Corporation, the original lessor; American District
Telegraph Company (ADT), the installer of the burglar alarm; and the
Towle Company, the subsequent lessor. Using the Minnesota compara-
tive negligence statute,2 the jury allocated fault as follows: Apache,
forty-eight percent; ADT, twenty-five percent; Vermes, seventeen per-
cent; Towle, ten percent. Because the defendant Towle was less negli-
gent than the plaintiff, it was not liable.3 ADT and Apache, however,
were both liable for the losses the plaintiff sustained from the burglary
because the culpability of each exceeded that of the plaintiff.,
58. 298 Minn. at 323, 215 N.W.2d at 826.
1. - Minn. - , 251 N.W.2d 101 (1977).
2. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1976).
3. See id. § 604.01(1).
4. See - Minn. at __, 251 N.W.2d at 103. The supreme court reversed the judg-
ment of the trial court against ADT. The court held that it was error to submit the
[Vol. 4
1
et al.: Landlord-Tenant Law—The Duties of a Commercial Landlord to Inform
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978
RECENT CASES
Two major issues were presented to the Minnesota Supreme Court on
the appeal by Apache. The first issue was whether the exculpatory
clause in the lease exempted Apache from liability for its own negli-
gence, thus barring the plaintiff's claim. The second issue was whether
the burglary was a superseding cause which relieved Apache of liability.
The court resolved the first issue by deciding that the exculpatory
clause was inoperative. In doing so, the court relied on its previous
discussion of the test for determining the enforceability of an exculpa-
tory clause in Rossman v. 740 River Drive. 6 In Vermes, the court utilized
that test,7 which balances two competing interests: public policy favor-
ing freedom of contract and public policy favoring the landlord's observ-
ance of certain duties.' The court in Rossman held that exculpatory
question of ADT's liability to the jury. As a matter of law, the written agreement between
the plaintiff and ADT limited the liability of ADT. ADT undertook neither to insure
against loss by burglary nor to evaluate and design the store's security system. Thus, ADT
fulfilled its only contractual obligations by installing a burglar alarm system in the plain-
tiff's store. See id. at -, 251 N.W.2d at 103-04.
5. A less important issue concerned the amount of damages awarded. The actual pecu-
niary loss sustained by the plaintiff was $47,185.03, but the jury awarded the plaintiff only
$23,000. On a post-trial motion by the plaintiff, the trial judge raised the damages to
$47,185.03. The supreme court agreed that the jury award was insufficient. Therefore, the
court upheld the revised award, offset by the jury's allocation of 17% fault to the plaintiff.
Because the liability of the codefendants was eliminated, Apache was liable for the full
83%. See id. at -, 251 N.W.2d at 106-07. Towle was not liable because the percentage
of fault allocated to it was less than the negligence of the plaintiff. See MINN. STAT. §
604.01(1) (1976). ADT, as a matter of law, was exonerated from liability by the supreme
,ourt. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
6. . Minn. - , 241 N.W.2d 91 (1976).
7. Minn. at - , 251 N.W.2d at 105.
8. . Minn. -, -, 241 N.W.2d 91, 92 (1976). The general precept is that freedom
of contract remains inviolate except when the contract violates some principle of great
importance to the general public. This balancing test has long been relied on to determine
the enforceability of exculpatory clauses in contract cases generally. E.g., Independent
School Dist. No. 877 v. Loberg Plumbing & Heating Co., 266 Minn. 426, 434, 123 N.W.2d
793, 798 (1963); Weirick v. Hamm Realty Co., 179 Minn. 25, 228 N.W. 175 (1929). By
applying the test in lease cases like Rossman and Vermes, the court tacitly recognizes a
lease as a form of contract, at least insofar as exculpatory clauses are concerned.
At common law, however, a lease was viewed primarily as a conveyance rather than as
a contract. See, e.g., 1 AMIacAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952). The only
covenant implied to the landlord was to deliver the land to the lessee and leave him in
quiet possession of it. See, e.g., Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical
Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FoRDHAM L. REv. 225, 227 (1969).
A landlord had no duty to convey habitable premises or to keep the premises in repair.
E.g., Krueger v. Ferrant, 29 Minn. 385, 387, 13 N.W. 158, 159 (1882). Gradually, excep-
tions eroded the rule of "caveat lessee." The "public use" exception required landlords to
deliver the premises free from dangerous defects if the premises were open to the public.
See, e.g., Spain v. Kelland, 93 Ariz. 172, 379 P.2d 149 (1963). For a discussion of the
"common use" exception, see note 12 infra.
Eventually, by both legislative enactment and judicial decision, the law implied affirm-
ative duties on the landlord. See, e.g., Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W.
19781
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clauses are enforceable except "in cases when the particular contract
violates some principle which is of even greater importance to the gen-
eral public,"' than freedom of contract. Thus, if a duty is deemed
"basic" to the relationship between the landlord and tenant, an excul-
patory clause relating to that duty will not be enforced. 0 Conversely, if
the duty is not deemed "basic" an exculpatory clause agreement will be
enforced."
The Rossman court offered examples to flesh out the meaning of
"basic duty." The duty of a landlord to maintain the common stairways
and hallways to avoid personal injury to tenants was deemed basic." By
contrast, a duty to maintain the temperature of the premises at such
levels as will not injure a tenant's tropical houseplants was not seen as
basic. 3 The Rossman rule, then, makes the enforceability of exculpatory
agreements depend on the "nature of the particular duty breached.""
148 (1931) (implied covenant of habitability); MINN. STAT. § 504.18 (1976) (duty to provide
and maintain residential premises in a habitable condition).
Even today, however, leases are not entirely within the rubric of contract law. Contract
law provides that if one party fails to carry out his obligations, the other party is excused
from performance. RzsTATEmENT OF CONTRACTS § 397 (1932). Covenants in a lease, on the
other hand, have generally been regarded as independent of one another. E.g., Fritz v.
Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 57, 213 N.W.2d 339, 341 (1973). Thus, if a landlord breached his
express covenants, the tenant was still obliged to pay rent. The United States Supreme
Court has held that it is constitutional for states to treat covenants in a lease as indepen-
dent. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 68 (1972). However, the Minnesota court has gone
beyond this constitutional minimum and held that the statutory covenants and the duty
to pay rent are mutually dependent. See Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 57-58, 213
N.W.2d 339, 341 (1973). But see University Community Prop., Inc. v. Norton, - Minn.
-, -, 246 N.W.2d 858, 861-62 (1976) (breach of a collective bargaining agreement
not a defense in an unlawful detainer action).
9. - Minn ..... 241 N.W.2d 91, 92 (1976).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. This duty was a common law exception to the general rule of landlord nonliabil-
ity for injuries to tenants. This "common use" exception required that a landlord maintain
in a safe condition those areas retained in his control for the common use of tenants. See,
e.g., Coenen v. Buckman Bldg. Corp., 278 Minn. 193, 199, 153 N.W.2d 329, 334 (1967);
Strong v. Shefveland, 249 Minn. 59, 63, 81 N.W.2d 247, 250 (1957); Nubbe v. Hardy
Continental Hotel Sys., Inc., 225 Minn. 496, 499, 31 N.W.2d 332, 334 (1948).
13. - Minn .. .-, 241 N.W.2d 91, 92 (1976). Perhaps the court is not being
very helpful. The duty to maintain room temperatures at levels conducive to the growth
and care of exotic plants may be nonexistent, not merely capable of being exculpated.
14. Id. The position of the court is that the landlord is free to exculpate his liability
unless the agreement would relieve him from liability for the consequences of a breach of
duty imposed by statute or dictated by public interest. See note 8 supra and accompany-
ing text. It is difficult to overcome the general precept that freedom of contract should
remain inviolate because few duties have been judicially defined as affecting the public
interest. See, e.g., Santa Fe, P. & P. Ry. v. Grant Bros. Constr. Co., 228 U.S. 177, 188
(1913) ("the highest public policy is found in the enforcement of the contract which was
actually made"); Wade v. Six Park View, Inc., 25 N.J. Super. 433, 439, 96 A.2d 450, 453
(Cty. Ct.) (fact that 3,500 people live in an apartment complex does not establish a public
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The court in Vermes held that Apache was under a basic duty to
inform the prospective tenant of the conditions of the premises which
might affect their suitability as a jewelry store.'5 Apache breached this
basic duty when it failed to inform the plaintiff of the latent unsubstan-
tial ceiling condition. The court reasoned that the particular business
needs of commercial tenants often require the leased premises to have
specific attributes. Therefore, the duty of disclosing any condition which
might reasonably be undesirable from the tenant's point of view is
basic."1
The court's articulation of a general duty of disclosure for a commer-
cial landlord makes Vermes a significant case in commercial landlord-
tenant law. Before Vermes, what might be called a "doctrine of caveat
lessee" appeared to be the prevailing rule in Minnesota insofar as a
tenant's commercial use was concerned. 7 The statute establishing a
landlord's covenant of habitability applies only to the leasing of residen-
tial premises.'" But Vermes extends the duty of landlords by making it
a landlord's duty to inform the prospective commercial tenant of condi-
tions which might render the premises unsuitable for the tenant's par-
ticular commercial use.
The second major issue on appeal was whether the burglary consti-
tuted a superseding cause, thus relieving Apache of liability. The court
interest), aff'd, 27 N.J. Super. 469, 99 A.2d 589 (App. Div. 1953); Maglin v. Weinberg, 21
Pa. D. & C.2d 630, 633 (1959) (public interest is established if violation of a statute is
involved in the negligent conduct).
Thus, lease agreements between private parties shifting the risk of loss to one party,
whether or not caused by negligence of the other party, have been enforced. See, e.g.,
Govero v. Standard Oil Co., 192 F.2d 962, 964-65 (8th Cir. 1951); Weirick v. Hamm Realty
Co., 179 Minn. 25, 228 N.W. 175 (1929); Midland Carpet Corp. v. Franklin Associated
Prop., 90 N.J. Super. 42, 47, 216 A.2d 231, 234 (App. Div. 1966). The position of the courts
in these cases is that leases are private matters between the lessor and lessee and do not
involve the general public. Arm's length agreements between contracting parties must,
therefore, be enforced. See, e.g., Weirick v. Hamm Realty Co., 179 Minn. 25, 228 N.W.
175 (1929) (arm's length bargain between lessor and lessee). But see Kuzmiak v. Brook-
chester, Inc., 33 N.J. Super. 575, 586-87, 111 A.2d 425, 432 (App. Div. 1955) (exculpa-
tory clause in residential lease unenforceable because scarcity of housing resulted in une-
qual bargaining power of landlord and tenant).
15. - Minn. at - , 251 N.W.2d at 105.
16. Id.
17. This was not a strict caveat lessee doctrine, however. Courts did impose duties on
commercial landlords in certain circumstances. The landlord was under a duty to main-
tain the common areas of the leased premises or any area over which the landlord main-
tained control. See note 12 supra and accompanying text. Also, the landlord was under a
duty to disclose defects on the premises which posed a threat of physical harm to either
the tenant or the tenant's guests, customers, patients, or clients. See note 8 supra and
accompanying text. But there was no general duty of disclosure nor implied covenant of
suitability imputed to the commercial landlord. See Wilkinson v. Clauson, 29 Minn. 91,
93, 12 N.W. 147, 148 (1882) (no implied covenant in lease that leased stores were to be
suitable for the tenant's use).
18. See MINN. STAT. § 504.18 (1976).
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held it was not. The bare fact that a criminal act is a link in the chain
of causation does not automatically relieve a negligent party from liabil-
ity.9 To be a superseding cause, the criminal act itself must not be
reasonably foreseeable. 0 If criminal acts are reasonably foreseeable by
the landlord, the landlord is then under an obligation to guard against
them."'
This rule was applied by the Minnesota Supreme Court recently in
Hilligos v. Cross Co.2 In Hilligos, a tenant brought a negligence suit
against his landlord following a burglary of his apartment. The tenant
had been hospitalized and during his week-long absence the landlord
placed a notice on the tenant's door notifying him that the lock had been
changed and that the new key could be picked up at the rental office.
This notice remained on the door for several days. The apartment was
burglarized during this period, entry apparently being made without
force. The court affirmed the trial court's granting of the defendant's
19. The rules for when an intervening cause will act as a superseding cause and thus
immunize the original actor from liability were collected in Kroeger v. Lee, 270 Minn. 75,
132 N.W.2d 727 (1965), where the court said:
For a cause to be superseding, the following elements must be present: (1) Its
harmful effects must have occurred after the original negligence; (2) it must not
have been brought about by the original negligence; (3) it must actively work
to bring about a result which would not otherwise have followed from the origi-
nal negligence; and (4) it must not have been reasonably foreseeable by the
original wrongdoer.
Id. at 78, 132 N.W.2d at 729-30.
The general rule is that a criminal act is a superseding cause if the act is foreseeable.
See Wallinga v. Johnson, 269 Minn. 436, 439-40, 131 N.W.2d 216, 219 (1964) (foreseeable
by hotel that its office containing valuables entrusted to it by guests for safe-keeping
would be burglarized). The original actor cannot claim immunity from liability when the
possibility that the criminal act will occur is one of the hazards he should guard against.
See, e.g., d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886, 894 (9th Cir. 1977) (effect of
fire on its product and possibility of arson resulting in death were reasonably foreseeable
by defendant carpet manufacturer); Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173, 178-79 (D.C. Ct. App.
1977) (landlord liable for losses sustained by tenant from gunpoint robbery in the common
hallway of the apartment building; defendant had failed to take security precautions even
though another tenant had previously been robbed at knifepoint, the presence of strangers
in the building had been reported by other tenants, the building was situated in one of
the worst crime areas of the city, and neighboring apartment complexes had instituted
certain security measures); Concord Fla., Inc. v. Lewin, 341 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1976)
(cafeteria owner liable for failure to guard against the foreseeable risk that arsonist would
set fire to the building); Johnson v. Sculley Constr. Co., 255 Minn. 41, 52, 95 N.W.2d 409,
417 (1959) (foreseeable by possessor of land that persons would try to steal gasoline from
premises; possessor therefore liable for injury caused to child when thief tripped and
spilled stolen gasoline on fire and on plaintiff); Atamian v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 146
N.J. Super. 149, 157-58, 369 A.2d 38, 42 (Law Div. 1976) (store liable for the rape of female
customer in unlighted, unguarded parking lot).
20. See note 19 supra.
21. See notes 24-25 infra and accompanying text.
22. 304 Minn. 546, 228 N.W.2d 585 (1975) (per curiam).
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motion for summary judgment."
For his argument that the burglary was reasonably foreseeable, the
plaintiff in Hilligos had relied on a New York case involving a landlord's
liability for a wrongful death in a high violent-crime area.2' The court
distinguished that case on its facts, noting that evidence of prior crimes
in the area had been determinative of the landlord's liability. 5 This was
the sole discussion of the court's reasons for affirmance in Hilligos.
Three justices dissented, reasoning that the foreseeability issue should
have gone to the jury.
Vermes, like Hilligos, involved economic loss, not personal injury. In
addition, no evidence was introduced in either case that similar inci-
dents of crime had occurred in the area. In both cases, the court appar-
ently relied on the foreseeability issue to reach its decision. But in
Hilligos the burglary was deemed unforeseeable, and in Vermes it was
deemed foreseeable.
There are several possible explanations for the disparate outcomes.
The court may be liberalizing the standards for when a crime will be
deemed foreseeable. Thus, landlords would more frequently have a legal
duty -to use reasonable measures to minimize the foreseeable risk of
criminal actions against tenants. A second explanation is that the court
is approving jury resolution of the foreseeability issue in such cases,
pursuant to the dissenting opinion in Hilligos. Finally, the court may
have found the landlord's conduct in Vermes more egregious than his
counterpart's conduct in Hilligos. Thus, the totality of circumstances in
Vermes-the unsubstantial ceiling condition, the free use of pass keys
by employees in the building, and the questionable security measures
regarding the door to the access room above the jewelry store-may have
been compelling indicia of the likelihood of burglary, whereas a similar
risk in Hilligos was not apparent.
It is not clear which of these explanations, if any, is correct. The
23. See id. at 548, 228 N.W.2d at 586.
24. See id. The case relied on by the plaintiff was Bass v. City of New York, 61 Misc.
2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 38 App. Div. 407, 330
N.Y.S.2d 569 (1972).
25. In Bass v. City of New York, 61 Misc. 2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1969),
rev'd on other grounds, 38 App. Div. 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1972), the evidence indicated
that the apartment complex consisting of ten 14-story buildings was ridden with crime.
Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly relied on the frequency of proximate criminal
activity in determining whether a landlord should have anticipated, and thus guarded
against, a criminal act. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (trial court did not err in admitting evidence of prior similar crime at trial of
tenant's suit against landlord for negligence in allowing security system to deteriorate
despite a concurrent increase of crime in the area); Samson v. Saginaw Prof. Bldg., Inc.,
393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975) (foreseeable by landlord leasing space to state
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disparitybetween the cases leaves in doubt when criminal conduct will
be deened foreseeable. It is clear that past instances of crime are rele-
vant to, but not determinative of, the issue of foreseeability.2' Beyond
that factor, however, the court has not clarified when landlords are
duty-bound to afford their tenants protection from crime.
In conclusion, Vermes raised the significant issues of when a landlord
has a duty to inform a commercial tenant of undesirable conditions of
a premises and when a criminal act against a tenant supersedes a land-
lord's liability for negligence. The court's disposition of these issues
provides some guidance in determining a landlord's duties to inform and
protect. Both issues, however, need further clarification through case
law before the extent of those duties can be fully understood.
Municipal Corporations-SPECIAL ASSESSMENT DETERMINATION-In re
Village of Burnsville, - Minn. -, 245 N.W.2d 445 (1976).
Special assessments levied by municipalities for local improvements
add to the tax burden imposed on Minnesota citizens which now ranks
among the highest in the nation.' The advantage of a general tax is that
necessary public services are provided by government and the burden
is apportioned among all citizens. The purpose of a special assessment,
however, is to fund local services that do not justify payment from
general revenues. Originally, special assessments were held to violate
the state's constitutional requirement of equal taxation.2 However, an
amendment to the Minnesota Constitution in 1869 specifically vali-
dated the use of special assessments for local improvements.3
In the recent case of In re Village of Burnsville,' the Minnesota Su-
preme Court reaffirmed settled interpretations of the 1869 constitu-
tional amendment. In 1963, Burnsville began to assess property at $300
per acre for sewer service. In subsequent years, nearly all the property
in Burnsville was serviced, except for property owned by respondent,
located on the floodplain of the Minnesota River.6 When an interceptor
26. See - Minn. at __, 251 N.W.2d at 106.
1. See MINNESOTA TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION, How DOES MINNESOTA COMPARE? 2 (1976).
2. Bidwell v. Coleman, 11 Minn. 78, 91 (Gil. 45, 56) (1865); Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn.
366 (Gil. 326) (1862).
3. MINN. CONST. art. 10, § 1, construed in Rogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494, 507
(1876).
4. - Minn. -, 245 N.W.2d 445 (1976).
5. See Carlson-Lang Realty Co. v. City of Windom, - Minn . . 240 N.W.2d
517, 519 (1976); Village of Edina v. Joseph, 264 Minn. 84, 95-99, 119 N.W.2d 809, 817-18
(1962); State v. District Court, 33 Minn. 295, 306-10, 23 N.W. 222, 227-29 (1885); Rogers
v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494, 507 (1876).
6. In re Village of Burnsville, - Minn. -, -, 245 N.W.2d 445, 447 (1976). Some
service was provided to adjoining land in 1967. Id. Burnsville contended that trunk service
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